Thomas Marschak

Education
PhD, Economics, Stanford University
AM, Economics, Stanford University
Graduate Study, University of Chicago
PhB, University of Chicago
Positions Held
At Haas since 1960
2013-present:  Professor Emeritus, Haas School of Business and Professor of the Graduate School
1967-2013, Professor, Haas School of Business
1968 – 1970, Chairman, Center for Research in Management Science, Haas School of Business
1962 – 1967, Associate Professor, Haas School of Business
1960 – 1962, Assistant Professor, Haas School of Business
1954 – 1959, Economist, RAND Corporation
Current Research and Interests
- Informational and incentive aspects of the design of efficient organizations - The effect of information technology on the organization of firms

Selected Papers and Publications
- “Does More Information-gathering Effort Raise or Lower,the Average Quantity Produced?” (with J.G. Shanthikumar and J. Zhou), Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 69, March 2017, 104-117. - “A Newsvendor Who Chooses Informational Effort” (with J.G. Shanthikumar and Junjie  Zhou), Production and Operations Management,  Vol. 24, No. 1, 110-133, 2015   -  “Technological Improvement and the Decentralization Penalty in a Simple Principal/Agent Model” (with Ruochen Liang), SSRN e-library 2945702, April, 2017. - “Are Information-gathering and Producing Complements or Substitutes?”  (with J.G. Shanthikumar and Junjie  Zhou), Working Paper, January, 2014. SSRN2516174 - “Information Technology and the Organization of Firms.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 13 (2004): 473-515. - “Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games,” with D. Courtney. Topics in Theoretical Economics (Berkeley Electronic Press) 6, no. 1 (2006). - “Complementarity and Inefficiency in Sharing Games,” with D. Courtney. Review of Economic Design 13, no. 7 (2009): 7-43. - “Organization Structure,” in_ Handbook of Economics and Information Systems_, edited by T. Hendershott, 205-290. Elsevier, 2006. - “Comparing Finite Mechanisms,” with Leonid Hurwicz. Economic Theory 21, 783-841 (2003). - “Finite Allocation Mechanisms: Approximate Walrasian versus Approximate Direct Revelation,” with Leonid Hurwicz. Economic Theory 21 (2003): 545-572. - “Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies,” with S. Reichelstein. Journal of Economic Theory (March 1998): 106-141. - “Independence versus Dominance in Personal Probability Axioms,” in vol. 3 of Unc_ertainty, Information and Social Choice: Essays in Honor of Kenneth Arrow_, edited by W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, 129-171. Cambridge University, 1986. - “Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria,” with Reinhard Selten. Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1978): 210-236. - General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms, with Reinhard Selten. Springer, 1974.

Honors and Awards
- Co-winner of Koc University prize, for best article in Economic Design, 1996 - Elected Fellow of the Econometric Society, 1975 - Fulbright-Hays Research Award, 1965-66 - Guggenheim Fellow, 1965-1966 - Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship, 1962-1963 - Awarded McKinsey Foundation Prize for Best Article in Journal of Business, 1960 - Fellow, Social Science Research Council, 1956-1957