Michael Richter

Academic Degrees

• PhD, Economics, New York University, 2012
• MS, Mathematics, University of Oregon, 2004
• BS, Mathematics, University of Chicago, 2002

Publications

“Status Quos in Choice and Games” (with Begum Guney), Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.

“Holding a Group Together: game­theory vs. non­game­theory” (with Ariel Rubinstein), Economic Journal, 131, 2629­2641, 2021

“Ordinal Allocation” (with Chris Chambers), Social Choice and Welfare, August, 2020.

“The Permissible and the Forbidden” (with Ariel Rubinstein), Journal of Economic Theory, 188, 2020.

“Convex Preferences: A New Definition” (with Ariel Rubinstein), Theoretical Economics, 14, 1169-1183, 2019.

“Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and a Population of Agents,” Games and Economic Behavior, 115, 30-47, 2019.

“Costly Switching from a Status Quo” (with Begum Guney), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 156, 55-70, 2018.

“Aspiration-Based Choice” (with Begum Guney and Matan Tsur), Journal of Economic Theory, 176, 935-956, 2018.

“Embedding Convex Geometries and a Bound on Convex Dimension” (joint with Luke Rogers), Discrete Mathematics, 340, 1059-1063, 2017.

“An Experiment on Aspiration-Based Choice” (with Begum Guney), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 119, 512-26, 2015.

“Back to Fundamentals: Abstract Competitive Equilibrium” (with Ariel Rubinstein), American Economic Review, 105(8), 2570-94, 2015.

“Fully Absorbing Dynamic Compromise,” Journal of Economic Theory, 152, 92-104, 2014.

“Choosing the Two Finalists” (with Kfir Eliaz and Ariel Rubinstein), Economic Theory, 46, 211-219, 2011.