Joe Fisher

Professor Fisher''s research interests focus on financial control in complex organizations and on the use of financial

Areas of Expertise

Managerial (strategic) Control Systems, Budgeting Systems, Costing Systems, Target Costing, Financial and Non-Financial Control Systems, Activity-based Costing

Academic Degrees

• Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1987

Professional Experience

• Tuck School-Dartmouth College
• Visiting Professor, Theseus Institute, France
• Visiting Professor, International University of Japan
• Visiting Professor, Helsinki School of Economics

Awards, Honors & Certificates

• Various Teaching Awards
• Currently Serves on 3 Editorial Boards
• FedEx Faculty Fellowship
• KPMG Faculty Fellowship

Selected Publications

• Fisher, Joseph G., J. R. Fredrickson, and S. A. Peffer (2002), “The Effect of Information Asymmetry on Negotiated Budgets: An Empirical Examination,” Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 27, January-March, pp. 27-43.

Abstract This study examines 3 issues: 1. the effect of information asymmetry on the budget negotiation process, 2. the effect of information asymmetry on budgetary slack when budgets are set through a negotiation process, and 3. whether subordinates consider superiors imposing a budget following a failed negotiation as being low in procedural justice, which in turn causes low subordinate performance. The results suggest that smaller differences in initial negotiation positions do not indicate a higher likelihood of agreement when initial differences are due to differential information asymmetry. Having superiors impose a budget after a failed negotiation causes justice or fairness considerations to demotivate subordinates.