Robert Ridlon

Areas of Expertise

Game Theory, Contests in Marketing Strategy, Pricing Strategies, Consumer Decision Making, Auctions

Academic Degrees

• PhD , Indiana University, 2008
• MS, Indiana University, 2007
• BS, Indiana University, 2001
• AS, Belleville Area College, 1999

Professional Experience

• Indiana University, Kelley Business School, Visiting Assistant Professor (2011 – Present)
• Sungkyunkwan University, Graduate School of Business, Assistant Professor of Marketing (2008 – 2011)
• Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Business, International Faculty Fellow (Spring 2010)

Selected Publications

• Ridlon, Robert (2016), "Does Manufacturer Advertising Crowd-in or Crowd-out Retailer Advertising? An Application of an Endogenous Prize Contest with Asymmetric Players," Southern Economic Journal, 83(2): 364-379.
• Ridlon, Robert, and Jiwoong Shin (2013), “Favoring the Winner or Loser in Repeated Contests,” Marketing Science, 32:5, 768-785.

Abstract Should a firm favor a weaker or stronger employee in a contest? Despite a widespread emphasis on rewarding the best employees, managers continue to tolerate and even favor poor performers. Contest theory reveals that evenly matched contests are the most intense, which implies that a contest designer can maximize each player''s effort by artificially boosting the underdog''s chances. We apply this type of "handicapping" to a two-period repeated contest between employees, in which the only information available about their abilities is their performance in the first-period. In this setting, employees are strategic and forward looking, such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the first-period contest result on the second period contest, and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly. The manager also incorporates these strategic behaviors of employees when determining an optimal handicapping policy. If employees'' abilities are sufficiently different, favoring the first-period loser in the second period increases total effort over both periods. However, if abilities are sufficiently similar, we find the opposite result occurs: total effort increases the most in response to a handicapping strategy of favoring the first-period winner.