Michael Fishman

Senior Associate Dean, Faculty and Research Norman Strunk Professor of Financial Institutions Professor of Finance Academic Director of CPU at Kellogg School of Management

Schools

  • Kellogg School of Management

Expertise

Links

Biography

Kellogg School of Management

Michael Fishman is the Norman Strunk Professor of Financial Institutions and was Senior Associate Dean: Curriculum and Teaching from 2011-2014.

Professor Fishman has published widely in finance and economics. His research focuses on financial market regulation and contracting. Recently, he has investigated insider trading, disclosure regulations, the role of self-regulatory organizations, and long-term financial contracting. He has won a number of research awards including the Smith Breeden Prize, awarded by the American Finance Association. He co-edited A Primer on Securitization (MIT Press, 1996). Professor Fishman has been on the editorial boards of a number of finance journals.

The graduates of Kellogg's Executive Masters Program chose Professor Fishman for the Outstanding Professor Award in 1995, 1997, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago.

Education

  • PhD, 1986, Economics, University of Chicago
  • MA, 1982, Economics, University of Chicago
  • BA, 1979, Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Academic Positions

  • Senior Associate Dean, Faculty and Research, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2018-present
  • Senior Associate Dean: Curriculum & Teaching, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2011-2014
  • Norman Strunk Distinguished Professor of Financial Institutions, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 1997-present
  • Chair, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2002-2005
  • Associate Professor of Finance, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 1992-1997
  • Assistant Professor of FInance, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 1985-1992

Awards

  • EMPOutstandingTeachingAward, Executive MBA Program Outstanding Teaching Awards, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 1997, 1995
  • Sidney J. Levy Teaching Award, Kellogg School of Management, 2008-2009, 2004-2005, 1993-1994
  • Named Runner Up for the 2008 Barclays Global Investors/ Michael Brennan Best Paper Award , Review of Financial Studies

Editorial Positions

  • Board Editor, American Economic Review, 2011-
  • Associate Editor, Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 2011-Present
  • Editor, Review of Financial Studies, 1998-2002
  • Associate Editor, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1993-Present

Courses Taught

Read about executive education

Cases

DeMarzo, Peter and Michael J. Fishman. 2007. Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting. Review of Financial Studies. 20(6): 2079-2128.

We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derive long-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities, capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate and limits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividend policy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equity ratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and, in some cases, the severity of the agency problem. In our model, the agent can divert cash flows; we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort, or can control cash flow risk.

Fishman, Michael J. and Kathleen Hagerty. 2003. Mandatory vs. Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 19(1): 45-63.

Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of information. This article analyzes why such rules are enacted. Specifically, (i) why wouldn't firms voluntarily disclose their private information; and (ii) given that voluntary disclosure would not be forthcoming, who has the incentive to lobby for mandatory disclosure rules? Previous analyses of disclosure assume that all customers understand the disclosures that can be made. A key result in these analyses is that there is no role for mandatory disclosure. Either voluntary disclosure is forthcoming or if it is not, no one is better off with mandatory disclosure. We analyze a market in which not all customers understand the disclosures that can be made. We show that if the fraction of customers who would understand a firm's disclosure is too low, then voluntary disclosure may not be forthcoming. In this case, mandatory disclosure benefits some (possibly all) customers and may also benefit firms. Thus we identify a motive for someone to lobby for such rules. Our results suggest that we should find mandatory disclosure rules with regard to information that is relatively difficult to understand.

DeMarzo, Peter and Michael J. Fishman. 2007. Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting. Review of Financial Studies. 20(6): 2079-2128.

We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derive long-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities, capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate and limits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividend policy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equity ratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and, in some cases, the severity of the agency problem. In our model, the agent can divert cash flows; we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort, or can control cash flow risk.

Fishman, Michael J. and Kathleen Hagerty. 2003. Mandatory vs. Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 19(1): 45-63.

Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of information. This article analyzes why such rules are enacted. Specifically, (i) why wouldn't firms voluntarily disclose their private information; and (ii) given that voluntary disclosure would not be forthcoming, who has the incentive to lobby for mandatory disclosure rules? Previous analyses of disclosure assume that all customers understand the disclosures that can be made. A key result in these analyses is that there is no role for mandatory disclosure. Either voluntary disclosure is forthcoming or if it is not, no one is better off with mandatory disclosure. We analyze a market in which not all customers understand the disclosures that can be made. We show that if the fraction of customers who would understand a firm's disclosure is too low, then voluntary disclosure may not be forthcoming. In this case, mandatory disclosure benefits some (possibly all) customers and may also benefit firms. Thus we identify a motive for someone to lobby for such rules. Our results suggest that we should find mandatory disclosure rules with regard to information that is relatively difficult to understand.

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