Thomas Noe

Thomas is an expert on corporate finance and corporate governance. His work has influenced both academic thought and business practice.

Thomas explores the effects of risk and incentives on the design of governance systems, contracts and financial networks. His work has influenced the way companies are financed through the issuance of securities, contributed to the way we analyse systemic risk for firms, and provoked a re-evaluation of the way senior managers are compensated. His work has appeared frequently in all leading finance journals and so many leading economics and management science journals. Currently he serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, and the Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.

Prior to joining Saïd Business School, Thomas held the AB Freeman Chair in Finance at Tulane University. He is a professorial fellow at Balliol College, and a research associate at the Oxford-Man Institute and the Centre for Corporate Reputation at Oxford University, and the European Institute for Corporate Governance.

*Expertise: *

• Corporate finance
• Financial security design
• Rewards in high-stake contests
• Management and CEO compensation
• Board design and corporate governance

Research

Thomas's research centres on how incentives, information, and competition affect corporate finance and corporate governance.

Specifically, this research focuses on financial security design, investment, governance, and managerial compensation/selection. Much of Thomas's work relates to the problem of designing incentives, control and contact systems, to maximise shareholder value, or to the effect of actual financial and managerial contract structures on corporate value. He as published more than sixty papers in leading academic journals such as Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, and Management Science.

His current research projects focus on how belief disagreement, family altruism, personality, and networks affect governance and the behaviour of financial managers.

The questions he is analysing include:

• What securities should firms issue to finance corporate acquisitions?
• How to bonus and rank-based status rewards interact and affect the risk-taking incentives of financial managers?
• How do selection/promotion systems based on relative ranking affect financial managers' effort and risk taking?
• Is it possible for large-scale, impersonal, financial markets to develop in settings where creditors have no legal rights?