Dirk Bergemann

Ph.D., Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1994 M.A., Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1992 Vordiplom, Economics, J.W. Goethe University, Frankfurt, 1989

Dirk Bergemann, is the Douglass and Marion Campbell Professor of Economics at Yale University. Dirk received his Vordiplom in economics at J. W. Goethe University in Frankfurt in 1989 and his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pennsylvania in 1994.

Dirk joined Yale in 1995 as an assistant professor, having previously served as a faculty member at Princeton University. He has been affiliated with the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale since 1996 and a fellow of the Econometric Society since 2007.

His research is concerned with game theory, contract theory and mechanism design. His research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship and the German National Science Foundation.

Dirk is the Chair of the Department of Economics at Yale since 2013 and a Co‐Editor of Econometrica since 2014.

Fields of Interest

• Industrial Organization
• Microeconomics
• Game Theory
• Learning and information acquisition in markets
• Dynamic contracts

Recent Working Papers:

• Search, Information and Prices, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris, March 2020
• The Economics of Social Data, with Alessandro Bonatti and Tan Gan, February 2020, Presentation Slides February 2020
• Information, Market Power and Price Volatility, with Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris, September 2019
• Progressive Participation, August 2019, with Philipp Strack, Presentation Slides December 2019
• Counterfactuals with Latent Information, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris, January 2019
• Information and Interaction, May 2017, with Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris

Recent and Forthcoming Publications:

• The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints, Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming, with Francisco Castro and Gabriel Weintraub, Presentation Slides April 2019
• Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris, Presentation Slides April 2019
• Markets for Information: An Introduction, Annual Review of Economics, 2019, 11, 85-107, with Alessandro Bonatti
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction, Journal of Economic Literature, 2019, 57, 235-274, with Juuso Valimaki
• Revenue Guarantee Equivalence, American Economic Review, 2019, 109, 1911-1929, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris
• Information Design: A Unified Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 2019, 57, 44-95, with Stephen Morris, Presentation Slides April 2017, Presentation Slides March 2018
• Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2018, 10, 177-218, with Johannes Hoerner
• First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction, SIGEcom Exchanges, 2018, 27-37, with Ben Brooks and Stephen Morris
• The Design and Price of Information, American Economic Review, 2018, 108, 1-45, with Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin