Dana Foarta

Research Statement

Dana Foarta’s primary research focus is to integrate theoretical models of domestic political decision making into the economic analysis of supranational institutions. Once political institutions are taken into account, richer insights emerge as to the types of common economic policies that governments can implement in practice. Her research asks how we can design institutions to limit the negative effects of political inefficiencies. Another research focus is on the agency problems within and between institutions. Specifically, she studies how the incentives of politicians or regulators, stemming from their re-election concerns or their employment contracts, shape the policy proposals they put forward. She focuses on contracting under strict limitations to monetary compensation (inflexible pay scales), an issue especially relevant to political economy. The challenge of selecting and motivating high ability politicians/regulators is closely related to issues confronting firms when selecting employees or investments, leading to broader implications for contracting.

Research Interests

• Political Economy
• Microeconomics
• Institutional and Regulatory Design
• Contracting Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Bio

Foarta is an assistant professor of political economy at Stanford Graduate School of Business. She teaches a core MBA course, Strategy Beyond Markets. She received her PhD in economics from MIT and her BA in economics and mathematics from Amherst College.

Academic Degrees

• PhD, Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 2014
• BA, Economics & Mathematics, Amherst College, 2009

Academic Appointments

• Assistant Professor, Stanford GSB, 2014-present

Awards and Honors

• John A. Gunn & Cynthia Fry Gunn Faculty Scholar, 2015-2016

Publications

Journal Articles

• Value for Money? Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability
  Jessica Leight, Dana Foarta, Rohini Pande, Laura Ralston Journal of Public Economics October 2020 Vol. 190
• The Management of Talent: Optimal Contracting for Selection and Incentives
  Dana Foarta, Takuo Sugaya The RAND Journal of Economics (advanced online March 7, 2021) 2020
• Wait-and-See or Step In? Dynamics of Interventions
  Dana Foarta, Takuo Sugaya American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (forthcoming) 2020
• The Limits to Partial Banking Unions: A Political Economy Approach
  Dana Foarta American Economic Review April 2018 Vol. 108 Issue 4–5 Pages 1187–1213

Working Papers

• Complexity and the Reform Process
  Dana Foarta, Massimo Morelli November 24, 2020
• The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information
  Vladimir Asriyan, Dana Foarta, Victoria Vanasco July 2020